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Abstract 
This article is a case study, providing a possible interpretation 
of the current Hungarian financial-legal culture.
How to apply those terms and conditions in long-term 
loan agreements in financial crisis, which are favourable or 
seemingly irrelevant in good times but turn out to be disad-
vantageous, sometimes even disastrous in bad times. How to 
calculate and allocate risks, what is acceptable and what is 
foreseeable to laymen? 
The focus here is on the laymen attitudes towards long-term 
contractual obligations and performances in the global finan-
cial crisis: whether debtors’ contractual obligations must be 
fulfilled, what should be construed as an excuse for non-perfor-
mance, whether there should be measures designed to protect 
the debtors more, if yes, at whose expense – the creditors (rather 
preventive measures) or the taxpayers (rather restitutive mea-
sures) –, if no, how to allocate ideally the risks and liabilities, is 
profit-making an evil per se, that needs to be managed?
Keywords 
Hungary, financial crisis, long-term loan agreement, credit and 
financial culture, liability, risk assessment, foreseeability, risk 
allocation, trust, state, market
“Imagine that the keeper of a huge, strong beast notices what makes 
it angry, what it deisres, how it has to be approached and handled, the 
circumstances and the conditions under which it becomes particularly 
fierce or calm…gently or wild.…He calls it knowledge, forms it into 
a systematic branch of expertise, and starts to teach it, despite total 
ignorance, in fact, about which of the creature’s attitutdes and desires 
is commendable or deplorable, good or bad, moral or immoral…since 
he hasn’t realised and can’t explain to anyone else how vast a gulf 
there is between necessity and goodness.”
(Plato: The Republic 493a-c)
1 Introduction
This article is about a possible interpretation of the current 
Hungarian financial-legal culture amongst the students, espe-
cially related to the private credits and private loan agreements.
It has been almost a decade since the latest financial crisis 
grew global. And although this kind of crisis – however differ-
ent it may have been – is an immanent characteristic of capital-
ism, there is still a great deal of doubts and uncertainty in the 
reactions of the (Hungarian) people. How to apply the rules and 
conditions in the agreements which were favourable or seem-
ingly irrelevant in good times but turn out to be disadvanta-
geous, sometimes even disastrous in bad times. Should they be 
foreseeable? Foreseeable to whom? 
The question whether there is such a thing like ethical econ-
omy (Griffiths - Lucas, 1996), has perhaps never been discussed 
so intensively and challenged so globally (Picketty, 2013), as 
it is nowadays. The motivation such as “greed is good” has 
perhaps never been to be hidden behind such a dense drapery. 
Besides, however, the series of questions of accountability or 
responsibility (liability) emerge ceaselessly together with anal-
ysis, should they be legal (Pázmándi, 2015), political, ethical or 
cultural (Fleck-Gajduschek, 2015). 
There is, certainly, nothing new in the problem of keeping 
a promise in adverse (economic) conditions. Hungary has also 
survived many wars, inflations, revolutions and turmoils1. The 
idea of pacta sunt servanda has long been a legal rule of civil 
1 See e.g. the Hungarian Legal Journal (Jogtudományi Közlöny) between 
1921-1923 for illustrating the problems of performance of long-term contracts 
under and after WW I.
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law in Hungary too. So it is accepted, that the parties must per-
form unless the newly emerged (excusable, unforeseeable?) 
circumstances make it impossible for a party to fulfill the ear-
lier promise, clausula rebus sic stantibus.
Obviously, the existence of such rules, such legal rules, 
require developed ideas about how individual and/or social 
risks are to be calculated and allocated (Hatzis, 2015). And 
further the existence of such rules does not necessarily mean 
that they are efficiently enforced or applied. The more such 
rules are part of a legal culture, the clearer it can be the kinds 
of events which may be unforeseeable (therefore excusable), 
really unexpected, and which are not.
Lately, the widespread use of long-term private credits (the 
consumer loans, or the consumer loan agreements) offer good 
chances to illustrate what people in Hungary think about long-
term obligations, responsibility, calculations, financial risks, 
liabilities, performances and excuses. The relevant question 
in law is, how likely and how foreseeable the various possi-
ble new scenarios (e.g. a global economic financial crisis) or 
the (non-) expected human reactions – both biologically (e.g. 
serious illness) and sociologically (e.g. a divorce, or unem-
ployment among – lower – middle class people) – could be. 
Some of these considerations are inevitable, for the parties 
entering into a contract, to calculate the risks (in both sides) 
and thereby allocating the liabilities properly, in other words, 
to use resources efficiently. If special unexpected changes in 
the performance or in the circumstances are not foreseeable 
or not arranged in the agreement properly, then instead of the 
prior risk minimization rules, the liability for damages must be 
applied so that to offer efficient remedies2.
The following article enquires the laymen reactions upon the 
above mentioned situations. It analyses the laymen attitudes 
of the long-term contractual obligations and  performance 
in the global financial crisis: (i) whether the obligations of a 
loan agreement have to be fulfilled no matter what new cir-
cumstances may occur, (ii) whether the original objective of 
the debtor in a loan agreement makes any difference in case 
of failure, (iii) what kind of events should be construed as 
an excuse for non-performance, (iv) whether there should be 
measures designed to protect the debtors more, (v) if yes, at 
whose expense – the creditors (rather preventive measures) or 
2 It should be emphasized, that the word “responsibility” here is being used 
in a much more broader sense than it is suggested by András Földi (Földi, 
2004) in his book, reviewing (also) the historical conception of responsibility; 
This, perhaps a little bit overbroad, understanding of responsibility is naturally 
due to the goal of the questionnaire which is to interrogate the laymen so the 
respondents are non-law students, therefore their interpretation of responsibil-
ity or liability or accountability may not be so distinctive. Also that is why my 
construction of responsibility here purports to include “cultural responsibility” 
such as solidarity as well and horribile dictu risk and responsibility might well 
be used interchangeably, since they are – in certain sense – just the other side 
of the same relations.
the taxpayers (rather restitutive measures), (v) if no, how to 
allocate ideally the risks and liabilities, and finally (v) whether 
profit-making is an evil per se, that needs to be managed.
2 The methodology
The survey was conducted through several years (between 
January 2013 and September 2016) among the same, from a 
statistical point of view, homogenious groups. The question-
naires were to be answered in every semester by the students 
of the business law course at the very beginning, in the first 
class. The students are therefore generally among 20-24 years 
of age and have presumptively different sociological and geo-
graphical backgrounds, of course. What makes them compa-
rable though, is their age, their lack of interest to be a lawyer, 
but their aim to be engineers or economists,  their being at the 
threshold of their professional life and basically their common 
educational culture at school. This generation was born after 
the Transition3. 
Naturally, the questionnaires are anonymous and non-oblig-
atory. The total number of answers so received is close to 400. 
The survey seeks to have answers on these students’ attitudes 
towards private expectations, private debts, private bankrupt-
cies, possible state duties and therefore implicitly, about con-
tractual obligations, market failures and perhaps solidarity. 
A caveat should be emphasised here, though. Undoubtedly, 
several hermeneutical doubts may occur, as in any question-
naire, by answering the questions in the different cases or legal 
situations. Since the aim is to find out the laymen’s reactions to 
the financial crisis, the various terms are actually used in their 
everyday common understandings, provided that there are any. 
So here there should be more scenarios (Pázmándi, 2015) to 
clarify.
First, when using the various legal terminus technicus which 
have no ‘exact’ correspondent terminology in the every day 
life, a broader lay-conception of the terms are to be understood. 
Thus, for example, there are no distinctions amongst the dif-
ferent long-term loan agreements, whether these cover a con-
sumer credit construction or a lease purchase contract or a sales 
and purchase agreement. These are to be understood as long 
term binding obligations.
Second, there are certain legal conceptions which do com-
ply with an everyday meaning but not necessarily to that one 
what the term would be used for. Consider, for example, the 
institution of private/individual bankruptcy, which was not even 
in the public discourse at the beginning of the conducting the 
survey (see fn. 9 and 11. below). Bankruptcy, as such, is foggy 
and pejorative in traditional Hungarian common discourse. It 
might refer to an unworthy release from debt, but could mean a 
3 “Transition” here is meant to describe the democratisation and marketi-
sation process of the post-communist societies after the collapse of the Soviet 
regime in East-Central Europe in the 1990s.
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cunning release from it too. Owe exactly to the very nature of 
this survey, that the students filled in this questionnaires without 
having had the chance to distinguish among the various insti-
tutions in the questionnaire, this private bankruptcy institution 
might represent different conceptions or have dubious and vague 
objectives for the respondents. In any event, this term might not 
give enough insight into its real meaning in the survey.
Third, in some cases certain pre-conception is already pre-
sumed on the part of the respondents. So for example, taking 
private loan for purchasing further real estates as an investment 
might qualify as private speculations for some, whereas busi-
ness investment for others. As a matter of fact who can tell? 
What makes a business to be a business, from a non-legal point 
of view? Also, the use of other somewhat vague terms, adjec-
tives, like “luxurious”  expenses, however relative their mean-
ings might be, lack the prior clarifications or distinctions too, 
so they are used as common sense, whatever that might well be 
(see fn. 7. below). 
3 The basic scenarios
The whole questionnaire has basically three different groups 
of questions. The first group of questions is A) what would 
someone do in case a private debtor (a consumer) fails to per-
form in a long-term loan agreement concluded for further three 
very different purposes: i) the purchase of a flat, ii) the purchase 
of a luxurious sport car or a luxurious vacation, or finally iii) the 
purchase of real estates as an investment. The second – here not 
to be discussed – group of questions B) concerns answers, like 
what would someone say if damage were caused at the work-
place and the claim should be against a company (employer) 
or against an employee. The third group of questions C) deals 
with the attitudes towards business or rather business fail-
ures, and enquires whether the small and medium entreprises 
(SMEs) should be supported by any regulations steered by the 
state and eventually what sort of deliberative decision-making 
would be satisfactory for any business calculation.
The analysis of these data, received from the responding 
students and processed in a freely accessable PSPP database, 
provides for the following results.
The basic scenarios of the private long-term loan agreement 
and the answers pertaining to them are the following (3.1., 
3.2., 3.3.). The very first questions of the survey are whether 
one would help someone else who is in failure of performing 
a long-term loan agreement, depending on the objective of the 
spending and the circumstances causing the default.
3.1 Saving for what?
According to the first scenario, in which a flat was pur-
chased, the indebted person failed, despite of his precautious 
acting by having calculated possible risks and costs well before 
the decision. He has failed due to the global economic and 
financial crisis and because his employer was wound up so he 
also looses his good job. The majority of the answers voted for 
help. (yes: 63.13 % - no: 32.96 %4).
When the same question concerned a slightly different sit-
uation, namely, that the failure to perform was due to the fact 
that the debtor’s wife got ill, and so needed more care that cost 
a lots of money and time, so he loses his job, the willingness of 
help even raise higher. (yes: 84.64 % - no: 11.73 %).
On the other hand, when the pay back of the loan is stopped 
because the couple decides to divorce and that proves to be too 
expensive, the helping intentions decrease dramatically. (yes: 
20.95 % - no: 74.58 %). 
So far it may be said that the respondents are quite sympa-
thetic to the debtors. It is well accepted to use credit for buy-
ing a place to live in even if one is without the means to do 
that. This may reflect the spirit of the post-socialism too, that 
the minimum level of existence may also include housing. Not 
many would think that this should not be so (~33%) but it is 
also not to conclude that these people would say that prior sav-
ing is the answer to such problems5. One thing is clear though, 
that respondents do punish those, who get into trouble upon 
their own faults, whatever this might mean. Obviously, the 
divorce is such a thing, whereas getting sick, of whatever kind, 
is not. In any event, these results should be read cautiously. The 
respondents are young, without own experience of the nature of 
a marriage and the diseases at all. 
3.2 Helping but how?
In the next scenario, this first question is endowed with a 
different background. The aim of the loan is different, thus the 
debtor, under the same circumstances, wishes to acquire a lux-
urious sport car or a luxurious vacation6, instead of a flat for 
the family. The failure of performance is however the same. 
Firstly, in case of the global financial crisis, the willingness to 
help the debtor is (relative to the above) very low. (yes: 14.53% 
- no: 82.40%). 
Secondly, however, when the failed performance is due to 
the illness of the spouse, the wanted help is higher again. (yes: 
54.75 % - no: 42.18 %). 
Thirdly, the vast majority refuses to help in the event of a 
divorce. (yes: 12.01 % - no: 84.64 %). 
The respondents are seemingly less sympathetic with the idea 
of a luxurious spending financed out of a loan. However it is still 
robustly accepted and supported if someone fails due to illness 
(~ 55% would help). It seems, that illness is regarded as an 
utterly bad and unjust fate, no matter why and how, which must 
be remedied.
4 Please note, that a few answer was illegible or missing, therefore the total 
of “yes” and “no” shall not be 100%.
5 Quite certainly, there is no such question about savings, since otherwise 
the respondents would have reacted in a biased way.
6 ‘Luxury’ might have meant ‘greed’ to some but ‘necessity’ to others. 
Assumedly, the answers reflect the distinctions.
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Clearly, however the objective of the spending (out of loan) 
makes quite a difference.
3.3 What is the role of responsibility?
In the final scenario, the loan is used differently again. 
Instead of buying a flat or getting a luxurious car or enter-
tainment, the aim here is to purchase further real estates as 
investments for the future. 
If global financial crisis caused the debtor to fail the per-
formance, a substantial majority of the respondents would say 
“no” to a helping request here. (yes: 24.58 % - no: 72.35 %). 
If however the spouse’s illness were the reason to stop pay-
ing back the loan, the respondents would be more willing to 
help. (yes: 62.29 % - no: 33.52 %). 
In case of divorce, on the other hand, this helping willing-
ness plummets again. (yes: 13.41 % - no: 80.73 %). 
Interestingly enough, if one takes a closer look at the results 
of these three basic scenarios, it is striking what differences 
there are in the anwers.
Table 1 Causes of failures compared
Yes for help in 
housing
Yes for help 
in luxurious 
spending
Yes for help in 
further real estate 
as investment
Cause of 
failures
63.13 % 14.53% 24.58 % global crisis
84.64 % 54.75 % 62.29 %
illness of 
spouse
20.95 % 12.01 % 13.41 % divorce
It seems to be important for the respondents what the aim 
of the long-term loan agreement is, and whether it is so jus-
tified, so as to be worth a common help. The minimum living 
existence (i.e. housing) is clearly more worth than a luxurious 
spending or a speculation as an investment. In any event, the 
respondents are also reacting on the variety of the causes of 
failures. The global financial crisis triggers help but much less 
than illness does.
It might well be the case that for these youngsters a divorce 
is such an overriding self default, that it is not worth futher 
inquiries what the circusmtances are/were. And it is true on the 
other way around, i.e. the spouse’s illness is such a devastating 
impact that should be outweighed with help, again, regardless 
to the circumstances.
The questionnaire consisted of further inquiries related to 
the above mentioned scenarios, digging for the “why”s and the 
“how”s of the plain “yes” and “no” answers. The basic sce-
narios remaining the same, the later answers are analysed in 
relation with the earlier ones. So these cross references are 
supposed to show what a respondent would say for further 
questions if at the start he decided for yes, for helping those in 
financial need, or on the other way round, what a respondent 
would say for further questions, if at the start he decided for 
no, for not helping those in financial need. Therefore the tables 
below (Table 2-4) demonstrate also a cross reference scrutiny 
to the very questions, in which the first line of anwers indicate 
whether the respondent would help (yes) or would not (no). 
Corollary, it means that the responses in the rows are related to 
the responses in the columns (yes-no). 
4 The analysis 
As a base line results here are the most important assess-
ments concluded during the survey, subject to the analysis and 
evidences, of course, as hopefully provided below.
4.1.One can hardly distinguish among the respondents as 
to their attitude towards the state and the free market. 
Distrust in both institutions is just almost palpable. 
4.2. The market rules are selectively accepted. In case of 
market failure the solutions are generally implicitly ex-
pected from the state.
4.3. Readiness to help others in need is relatively widespread 
if and only the cause is not self-inflicted and the spending 
is justified.
4.4. However well acknowledged it is, that market failures 
are indispensable, the expected cure from the state regu-
lations are just not trusted. 
4.1 One can hardly distinguish among the 
respondents as to their attitude towards the state 
(and the free market). Distrust in both institutions, 
market and state, is just almost palpable. 
Firstly, the question is, what do the respondents think, when 
to help, indeed, what sort of deliberation is to be concerned in 
the decision-makings. (The role of private savings). 
In the first question, our fictitious debtor might have been a 
responsible person and besides the loan, he would make some 
savings too. So he would take care of his own pension, private 
health service and future education for his children. In these 
cases a new question arises in all scenarios, namely, whether 
the respondent would reconsider his willingness or refusal to 
help, if he knew that the debtor could not pay because he has 
saved (or is just saving) money for retirement, illness and edu-
cation for his children. 
In the case of a global financial crisis the answers are the 
following (Table 2/A).
In Aa) case, i.e. when the debt is spent on a flat to live in, 
those who would help in the first place, would more likely 
reconsider their positive answer than those who would not 
support the debtor at all. It should be noted here, that the “yes” 
group formed quite the majority, i.e. 63.13% of the respon-
dents. So it seems, that almost half (42.11%) of the respon-
dents ready to help in need, would not assist to the debtor, 
if they knew, the debtor had savings (no matter what sort of 
savings). 
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Table 2 Saving for what?
Minibrain has an average but well-paying job, which allows him to make plans for long-term future as well. He and 
his wife live with their 2 minor kids together. 
A/a) They want a bigger flat, because 
they still live at Minibrain’s parents. 
So he calculated that since he cannot 
afford to buy a flat.  he takes a loan, 
which he later fails to pay in due in-
stalments, and while his flat is going 
to be auctioned, the rest of the debt is 
still to be paid back
A/b) Minibrain wants to have a sport-
car/a luxury vacation and calculates 
that even if he had such a solid financial 
background he would not be able to cover 
such an expense. So he takes a loan which 
he later fails to pay in due instalments, 
and while his flat is going to be auctioned, 
the rest of the debt is still to be paid back.
A/c) Minibrain thinks it is a good 
investment to purchase further real 
estates, to lease them or later to sell 
them for more. So he takes a loan 
which he later fails to pay in due 
instalments, and while his flat is 
going to be auctioned, the rest of 
the debt is still to be paid back
A
 
If he failed because his employer is 
wound up due to the global economic 
crisis. 
If he failed because his employer is 
wound up due to the global economic 
crisis.
If he failed because his employer 
is wound up due to the global 
economic crisis, 
 Would you help him? Would you help him? Would you help him?
 yes no yes no yes no
answer 63.13% 32.90% 14.53% 82.40% 24.58% 72.35%
Would you reconsider 
it, if he could not pay 
because he saved money 
for retirement, illness 
and education for his 
children?
yes 42.11% 9.20% 50.19% 1.10% 38.94% 8.51%
B
 
If he failed because his wife got 
seriously ill and the treatment is ex-
pensive, time consuming and finally 
he looses his job too.
 If he failed because his wife got 
seriously ill and the treatment is 
expensive, time consuming and finally 
he looses his job too.
 If he failed because his wife got 
seriously ill and the treatment is 
expensive, time consuming and 
finally he looses his job too.
 Would you help him? Would you help him? Would you help him?
 yes no yes no yes no
answer 84.64% 11.73% 54.75% 42.18% 62.29% 33.52%
Would you reconsider 
it, if he could not pay 
because he saved money 
for retirement, illness 
and education for his 
children?
yes 44.44% 9.79% 11.79% 9.79% 34.25% 4.55%
C
 
If he failed because he and his wife 
decide to divorce and the facilitation 
of the two separate lives imposes 
significant financial burden.
If he failed because he and his wife 
decide to divorce and the facilitation 
of the two separate lives imposes 
significant financial burden.
If he failed because he and his wife 
decide to divorce and the facilita-
tion of the two separate lives im-
poses significant financial burden.
 Would you help him? Would you help him? Would you help him?
 yes no yes no yes no
answer 20.95% 74.58% 12.01% 84.64% 13.41% 80.73%
Would you reconsider 
it, if he could not pay 
because he saved money 
for retirement, illness 
and education for his 
children?
yes 34.02% 12.10% 31.39% 8.43% 43.61% 9.99%
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Seemingly, the Ab) case is not much of a difference. In Ab) 
case, i.e. the luxurious spending case, a little more than the half 
(50.19%) of the “yes” respondents would reconsider the help and 
would be far less sympathetic with the debtor, if he knew about 
the savings. Here the odds is however, that this “little more than 
half” relates to a much less group of the respondents, the 14.53% 
original “no” group (as opposed to the 63.13%). So it means, 
that the pattern is the same: the half of the ‘yes’ majority would 
reconsider the answer. But the multitude here is much less. These 
figures make difference only in relation to the total responding 
population. In Aa) those who would reconsider their positive 
answers are 25% of the respondents whereas in Ab) only 7%.
Finally, the reconsideration of the ‘yes’ group is the least 
likely in case Ac), in which investments/speculations are the 
target of the loan. However, the difference between Aa) and 
Ac) seems to be within just a margin of deviation (42.11% vs. 
38.94%). But this 38.94% is counted from the 20.95% “yes” of 
the original help group as opposed to that of the 74.58% “no”. 
Nevertheless, the pattern is resembling to that of Aa) and Ab). 
To add it all up, one could draw the conclusion, that those 
who would not help in the first place at all  – no matter whether 
they are in the majority or in the minority – would be less 
likely to reconsider their answers. And here, this point must be 
stressed even more. Because, the question could be construed 
the other way round, so that to emphasise that although one 
would not help right away, but would do so, nonetheless, upon 
learning that the debtor failed because he had had savings, thus 
the debtor proves to be a rational one, worthy of support. It 
seems that this kind of interpretation did not occur.
Conspicuously enough, when the failure to perform is due 
to the spouse’s illness, the answers look very very different 
(Table 2/B). The luxurious spending in case of the illness of 
the debtor’s wife is the least favourable, therefore the least sup-
portable deed among all things. The  swings of reconsideration 
or not, i.e. the saying of “no” help instead of “yes” help, is 
the highest. (see Ab) in Table 2/A: 50.19%, Ab) in Table 2/B: 
11.79%, and Ab) in Table 2/C.: 31.39%). Nevertheless it should 
be borne in mind that these figures are very little if related to 
the total responses: they range from ~5.5% to ~7%.
And finally, if the stoppage of pay back is owe to the 
divorce, the results are as expected, (relatively) in accordance 
with the first scenario, i.e. in the case of global financial crisis 
(Table 2/C.). The difference however is still, that the original 
“yes” groups are smaller in this case, than in the housing pro-
vision case. That should definitely mean, that this investment/ 
speculation is rather regarded as business or as speculation 
which in failure would not worth public help.
One way to think about this, is that whatever the differences 
there might be, these data show little respect to the reasons why 
someone gets into trouble other than illness or divorce in the 
first place. As opposed to that, the very reason, that someone 
does have the aim to take care of himself and also of his family, 
matters little. Thus one inevitably gets to the conclusion, that 
(financial) responsibility, (financial) autonomy, thereby free-
dom (of the state?) means little among young respondents.
Another way to analyse these data, and it is remaining cer-
tainly unproven here, is whether or not these reconsiderations 
mean that the respondents look at the situation not as a sign of 
responsibility, but as a sign of financial capability of the debtor 
to pay out his debt. This attitude may therefore be interpreted 
as a manner mirroring a pure market answer. No one is in need 
who still has savings. 
However, if this speculative thinking is right, this train of 
thought might also reflect a kind of lack of institutional think-
ing (in financial matters). First of all, long-term savings may 
not necessarily guarantee liquidity. Second of all the bridg-
ing loans are designed also for exactly this kind of situations. 
Terminating a long-term savings contract before it is due, is not 
less of a damage than it is not to perform on time an installment 
of paying back a loan. If someone takes into consideration that 
long-term savings are delayed demands, then as a matter of 
social efficiency, the help in such a need should be, or may 
be, tackled with differently. Corollary, the discrepancy here 
between social justice and economic efficiency may be found 
to be false, but not for the respondents.
Besides it should be noted, however, that in general, it is not 
acceptable, as such, if someone without the means asks a loan 
for luxurious spending. And this remains even then so, when it 
turns out that the debtor had savings nonetheless. 
And this is absolutely different from the case, in which sick-
ness is involved in the failure of the performance. Certainly, this 
traditional view and this traditional ambience of sickness may 
seem anachronistic: “if you are ill, stay in bed”. But, clearly, 
there are so many kinds of illness. Also, one should consider, 
that in Hungary, the health insurance is part of the state bud-
get, however separate, and the contribution is collected as tax 
revenue. Illness is therefore already regarded as a living on 
public funds. No need for further support in case of luxurious 
expenses. Or it may be construed, in the contrary, that it is well 
justified (accepted) that ill people should be subsidized out of 
the public funds. But/or, corollary, people in Hungary have the 
impression, as a matter of fact, that ill people are generally poor 
or may become very quickly as one.
Brifely comparing these results for the sake of a possible con-
clusion, one might add the following doubts. The real question of 
the survey here was supposed to enquire the idea of self-support, 
or savings attitudes. It seems that the respondents would be more 
likely to help those in need who lack the means to get out of 
the financial problem. So far, so good. Since the here advocated 
help of the respondents proves to be, implicitly, state subsidized 
intervening measures (see below), it certainly causes some stress 
on the public budget, therefore this answer seems to be econom-
ically correct, efficient and pacifying. Those who have savings 
should use it first and then be aided by the community. 
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There are many distinctive and delicate ramifications of this 
attitude though. One is political, i.e. however this conclusion 
might be true, voters tend to think differently. (And this is so 
despite the fact that one could say the students represent rather 
the middle class than the lower or the lowest strata of the society 
or of the voters.) The other one is financial and not less com-
plicated. If one really ponders on the original question here, it 
should be obvious, that these kinds of savings are not at all (or 
not necessarily) big monies or significant wealths. These may 
rather be considered as conscious behaviour of the middle class 
civic virtue attitude, to act as a financially independent individ-
ual. An individual of its lockean or even kantian sense and an 
independence in its conception as that of the enlightenment. So 
perhaps confusingly enough, to conclude that precisely those 
should be helped who lack the possibility to survive a financial 
crisis at the expense of those who have made certain savings – 
just in order to avoid exactly this financial trap – proves to be the 
trick of the reason. This kind of solutions therefore may become 
counter-productive. There seem to be no motivation at all to act 
financially responsible7. The third one is a sociological consider-
ation, or educational for that matter. There is no doubt that only 
the most vulnerable needs to be protected in case of financial 
need and that it should be done even through the public assis-
tance, i.e. the public budget. And it is true as well, of course, that 
this help may only be carried out at the expense of those, who are 
not in financial trouble, or less hurt by the crisis for whatever rea-
son. Although it is all a matter of degree too. Notwithstanding, 
this kind of thinking creates a political-economic circulus vitio-
sus, which needs to be broken. And it can be done only through 
education (whatever that might mean, for generations to come or 
learning from scratch for every generation).
Secondly, the question is, helping but how. (The role of 
bankruptcy or preferential tax regime). 
The specific questions here concern two separate issues. 
Both of them may qualify as measures of definite state inter-
ventions but they put the burden of losses differently on the loss 
bearers. One of the questions is whether the respondent would 
support an individual bankruptcy for the debtor, the other one is 
whether the respondent would support a preferential tax system 
for private debtors. If one accepts the idea of individual bank-
ruptcy, i.e. supports it, however intrusive it might be into the 
private sphere of the contractual parties, the losses nevertheless 
are still to be born by the parties to the contract themselves. It 
is merely a new risk allocation which is being (re)negotiated 
in a case like this. On the other hand, if one promotes a pref-
erential tax system for the private debtors, then he goes along 
with a distribution of losses among the taxpayers, which means 
among third parties, outsiders, to the contract. 
7 This kind of arguments are also often used in the debates when the prin-
ciples of the income tax regime is discussed: proportional, linear, fixed, etc. 
(Byrne, 1999 or Schoenblum, 1995).
In any event, the real question in law is whether these long-
term contractual obligations are binding no matter what, or 
there should be certain possibilities to the parties for renego-
tiations. If this latter were accepted, then the exact procedure 
should be laid down in advance, so that business calculations 
were possible. As a matter of fact, in private debts, one recog-
nizes the rules of the consumer protection laws here, providing 
for the room for maneouver in advance, in which the parties 
may (fairly) reorganise their rights and duties, such as amend-
ing the contract or terminating the contract, etc.
The individual bankruptcy8 however, is not the legal institute 
per se of the consumer protection. Since this allows, or rather facil-
itates, the renegotiations between the parties under strictly regu-
lated circumstances, this is a much harsher state intervention forc-
ing the creditors to enter into a new agreement if the private debtor 
unilaterally so requested. Good such law may create a win-win 
position however, thus it is not entirely a market unfriendly legal 
institution. The losses are taken by the parties themselves accord-
ing to their new, certainly not quite regulation-free, agreement.
As opposed to that, the preferential tax system for private debt-
ors, distorts the markets. One could certainly add that preferential 
tax system does exist in free markets as well, so to distinguish 
this legal institution, might be a little problematic for youngsters. 
Because what may fit to the business investments, may not be so 
for private spenders. The nature of their costs, the social costs are 
different, the (social) effectivity of the concluded but so failed 
private contracts is dubious9. Free market can deal with external 
costs if and only there is no better solution for the socially desired 
contractual relations, see national defence or clean air, etc. But 
private spending is very different and may trigger many more 
problems beyond reach of this survey, such as biased administra-
tive decisions (corruption) or misrepresentation, etc.
One way of looking at the tables above (Table 3/A-3/C.), 
is to ask, how binding these long-term contractual obligations 
are to the debtors according to the respondents10. Not very 
much surprisingly, those who originally responded positively 
to help out those in financial need, answer overwhelmingly 
positive also to the questions whether they would support var-
ious state interfering measures. 
8 See also the Act No CV of 2015 on the bankruptcy procedure of natural 
persons. This statute introduces the individual / private bankruptcy for the first 
time ever in Hungary as of September 2015.
9 But of course requires concerns. No one likes homeless people lingering 
around.
10 Sadly enough, the answers may be confusing (the questions might have 
been confusing too), especially when compared with the third/last question 
in the line below (see there). Since the institution of private bankruptcy was 
non-existent even in the public discourse until mid-2015, its conception must 
have been a vague and broad idea of the respondents, meaning a special kind of 
termination of the contractual relation from 2013 to 2015. This reflects specu-
lation of course, supported only by teaching experiences rather than data. The 
students in class at the beginning can hardly distinguish a winding up or a 
bankruptcy, let alone a private/individual bankruptcy.
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If the performance failed because of the worldwide finan-
cial crisis, the majority of the respondents would support the 
help even with certain state intervention such as the individual 
bankruptcy and a little less intensively with the preferential tax 
regime11; see Aa) (Table 3/A). The pattern is somewhat similar 
in case of luxurious expenses, provided that one bears in mind 
that here the original “yes” group is the minority (14.53%); 
see Ab). The interesting situation is the question of investment/
speculation. As known, here the vast majority would say “no” 
(72.35%) and the vast majority of this (73.78%) says “no” to 
the preferential tax system as a measure to help in need as well; 
see Ac). On the other hand the support of the private bankruptcy 
is the highest in this group. Clearly, this scenario is regarded as 
business not worthy of help from public monies.
Having the above mentioned in mind, not surprisingly, 
this willingness to help is much much higher when the pay 
back was stopped due to the fact that the debtor’s spouse had 
become ill. The exception is again the luxurious expense in 
case of illness (Table3/B.). It is perhaps obvious, that the aver-
age respondent puts the blame on the creditors here. Why was 
money lended at all? Was it for profit? The further question 
occurs here though, whether respondents are able to distin-
guish the cases where the debtor is being sick at the time of 
entering into the contracts from those cases of getting the seri-
ous illness later, during the time of effectivity of the contract. 
Distincitions like these ones, are hard to be reflected in this 
survey, of course, especially because the respondents are stu-
dents, who are quite likely not to have personal experiences 
with contracts, negotiations,  and more importantly with the 
alleged prudential activities of the creditors.
However, still there are quite a few, who believe that in case 
of basic housing problems for those in need the preferential 
tax system may be a solution, i.e. almost the half of the over-
whelming majority (~44% of the 84.64% “yes” group, since 
55.56% said no).
If the contract were breached because the debtor had divorced 
(Table 3/C.), the figures are again substantially less in favour 
of the debtors just as in the cases where the results reflect own 
faults. If help were to be granted though, there would be no 
significant differences whether to support the individual bank-
ruptcy or the preferential tax regime. 
All in all, the responses to the “help but how” is supposed to 
answer the question of how to be released from a debt, how to 
be free from an obligation taken upon voluntarily. 
11 Please note, that the tables (Tables 3/A-3/C.) show the “yes” in the first 
row and the “no” in the second row. Therefore, in the second (“no”) row the 
opposite results are to be calculated. Albeit this might be more obscure and 
harder to interpret, the reason why these tables nevertheless use this sort of 
form is that this might reflect the first impression better, namely that those 
who would help, would trust the market less, therefore presumably support 
individual bankruptcy as opposed to the preferential tax regime. Here thus the 
comparison would like to rely heavily on the expectations of the state duties.
On the one hand, the responses here are in the line of the 
above mentioned findings again, namely, that basically the half 
of those who said “yes”, would not support preferential tax sys-
tem, meaning, that the help should not necessarily be provided 
for by the state budget. These results may trigger the interpre-
tation that the respondents may well be aware of their personal 
financial interests as taxpayers in not advocating a preferential 
tax regime for the debtors in failure. 
On the other hand, the idea of individual bankruptcy, how-
ever unclear this institution for the respondents might have 
been, seems to be quite as popular (or unpopular) for solving 
the problem as the preferential tax regime is, albeit in a way this 
allows the debtor to be released from his duties at the expense 
of the creditors rather than the taxpayers.
Since individual bankruptcy is rather missing in the public 
discourse the respondents might have been less familiar with 
this, and especially with its operation and aim. As a general 
conclusion, it could be confirmed though, that except for the 
minimum existing expectations, i.e. the provision of housing to 
those in need, where the majority would be the most sympa-
thetic towards the debtors, the respondents are not very much in 
favour of these kinds of measures, or they are quite split on it, to 
say the least. Thus, in brief, this would just strengthen the main 
characteristic result of the survey, meaning that the respondents 
equally lack the trust in both the state and the market solutions.
And thirdly or finally, one of the most intriguing questions, 
not only for lawyers, is the following one: whether the profit 
making is an evil per se. (The role of responsibility, and not 
only for bad economic decisions).
Whether it is acceptable that the market situations are not nec-
essarily win-win positions and so if there are bad financial cal-
culations, the outcome of the decisions needs to be borne by the 
decision-maker. Or quite to the contrary, whether there should be 
a mandatory state correction for market failures, so that to insulate 
decision-makers from the consequences of their own decisions.
This allows to ask whether the long-term loan agreement is to 
be (may be) terminated because of the problems having occurred 
on the debtor’s side but far beyond the debtor’s reach. It means 
that certain events, such as war, epidemy, natural disaster, global 
financial crisis, uprise, revolution, etc., may not be the doing of 
either party, still they have the almost unendurable impact on 
them or only one of them. Should it matter to us, if only one 
party suffers from the devestating affect, or if one of the party 
is better off, while the other is ruined owe to the changes in the 
circumstances, or should it not. In case of a private long-term 
loan agreement, there is no doubt, that the creditor undertakes 
a substantial risk, since the creditor generally does perform at 
once upon signing the contract, whereas the debtor has time 
to pay back. And this separation of deliveries of the parties to 
the contract, this discrepancy allowed by time, would make the 
risks of the parties unbalanced, unless specific guarantees are 
provided for in the terms and conditions otherwise.
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Table 3 Helping but how?
Minibrain has an average but well-paying job, which allows him to make plans for long-term future 
as well. He and his wife live with their 2 minor kids together. 
A/a) They want a bigger 
flat, because they still live at 
Minibrain’s parents. So he calcu-
lated that since he cannot afford 
to buy a flat.  he takes a loan, 
which he later fails to pay in due 
instalments, and while his flat is 
going to be auctioned, the rest of 
the debt is still to be paid back
A/b) Minibrain wants to have a 
sport-car/a luxury vacation and 
calculates that even if he had such 
a solid financial background he 
would not be able to cover such 
an expense. So he takes a loan 
which he later fails to pay in due 
instalments, and while his flat is 
going to be auctioned, the rest of 
the debt is still to be paid back.
A/c) Minibrain thinks it is a 
good investment to purchase 
further real estates, to lease 
them or later to sell them for 
more. So he takes a loan which 
he later fails to pay in due 
instalments, and while his flat 
is going to be auctioned, the 
rest of the debt is still to be 
paid back
A
 
If he failed because his employer 
is wound up due to the global 
economic crisis. 
If he failed because his em-
ployer is wound up due to the 
global economic crisis.
If he failed because his em-
ployer is wound up due to the 
global economic crisis, 
 Would you help him? Would you help him? Would you help him?
 yes no yes no yes no
answer 63.13% 32.90% 14.53% 82.40% 24.58% 72.35%
Would you support an individual 
bankruptcy?
yes 55.34% 15.30% 65.96% 5.20% 48.08% 32.30%
Would you support a preferential tax 
system for debtors?
no 48.80% 19.70% 58.17% 7.90% 46.63% 73.78%
B  
If he failed because his wife got 
seriously ill and the treatment is 
expensive, time consuming and 
finally he looses his job too.
If he failed because his wife got 
seriously ill and the treatment is 
expensive, time consuming and 
finally he looses his job too.
If he failed because his wife got 
seriously ill and the treatment 
is expensive, time consuming 
and finally he looses his job 
too.
 Would you help him? Would you help him? Would you help him?
 yes no yes no yes no
answer 84.64% 11.73% 54.75% 42.18% 62.29% 33.52%
Would you support an individual 
bankruptcy?
yes 61.81% 25.83% 16.39% 25.83% 51.57% 21.29%
Would you support a preferential tax 
system for debtors?
no 55.56% 81.03% 14.73% 81.03% 42.36% 84.21%
C  
If he failed because he and his 
wife decide to divorce and the 
facilitation of the two separate 
lives imposes significant 
financial burden. 
 If he failed because he and his 
wife decide to divorce and the 
facilitation of the two separate 
lives imposes significant 
financial burden. 
 If he failed because he and his 
wife decide to divorce and the 
facilitation of the two separate 
lives imposes significant 
financial burden. 
 Would you help him? Would you help him? Would you help him?
 yes no yes no yes no
answer 20.95% 74.58% 12.01% 84.64% 13.41% 80.73%
Would you support an individual 
bankruptcy?
yes 52.05% 31.50% 50.65% 29.22% 49.62% 26.97%
Would you support a preferential tax 
system for debtors?
no 59.02% 74.82% 44.82% 79.22% 49.62% 79.15%
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But what sort of events may be excusable or foreseeable 
and what others not? The respondents in this survey, seem-
ingly, decided that global financial crisis or illness are excus-
able, thus may trigger a rearrangement of the risk allocations. 
Divorce, on the other hand is not (see tables above). Now, why 
are they excusable? Does this mean that financial crisis and ill-
ness are unforeseeable and divorce is not? Nevertheless some 
would definitely say that divorce is much more foreseeable in 
the modern western culture than epidemy. Whereas there, cer-
tainly, are regions on earth, (even in Hungary too, nowadays) 
where the opposite should be true.
Here are the results for the case of failure to perform in 
global financial crisis (Table 4/A). It shows clearly, that the 
majority would help in need (63.13%) and the overwhelm-
ing majority of these respondents who say “yes” to the help, 
would not agree with an interpretation that the creditors are 
profiteers. Therefore only the 7% of all respondents would say 
the contracts are not to be paid back. So, implicitly, they do not 
seriously mean that the contracts should not be fulfilled.
But who should have the burden of failure then? 
Notwithstanding, if one looks at the other figures of the “no” 
group (32.9%), here the overwhelming majority is more 
inclined to blame the creditors (only 28.3% says no), and prob-
ably let the parties negotiate (see Aa) in Table 4/A) But these 
figures are also miniscule, i.e. 7% of all respondents. In case 
of the luxurious expenses the respondents have not too much 
of the solidarity. 82.40% would not help in the economic crisis 
for these spendings but would implicitly blame the creditors. 
Although only 9.80% of the 82.40% (these are the “no”-s) of 
these “no” respondents would say that the creditors are not 
usurers and the contractual obligations should be fulfilled, but 
this is 7% of the total answerers again.
But who are the creditors? Banks, financial institutions, 
friends or employers, state, perhaps? And when are they the 
creditors? After having helped out a debtor in need with a 
bridging loan in a financial global crisis?
This is fairly different in the case, in which the failure to 
perform is due to the wife’s illness and the spending out of 
loan covered luxurious entertainments (Table 4/B). 
Here it seems to be obvious that the majority would feel 
solidarity for ill people, but would not support a luxurious 
expense, if someone is ill. In fact, this has been the case above 
(and here, see Table 4/C) too if one looks at the figures of lux-
urious expenses being cross referenced with the illness of the 
debtor’s wife. Nevertheless, here it is more conspicuous than 
anywhere else, but for the above table (Table 4/C), that it is 
not at all clear whether the repondents believe, the creditors 
should have the burden of risk. In conjunction with what was 
said above about the attitude towards the problems of deseases 
though, the respondents here hold the creditors more liable for 
lending money irrationally, or lending rather for profiteering.
This interpretation raises further legally more relevant ques-
tions: when should an event be foreseeable for which one has to 
take the liability in a contractual relation. In case of a long-term 
loan agreement, the answer should clearly be that right at the 
entering into the contract.
The reason for this is the elapse of time between the exchange 
of performances of the contractual parties (Csehi, 2015)12. Thus 
sickness may only be foreseeable if the circumstances in the 
given case so suggest. Seemingly, the repondents here think, 
that the probability of a serious sickness is higher than that of 
the (global) financial crisis or of the divorce, as a matter of 
fact. Therefore the creditor bears the risk for sickness, since the 
creditor should have known it better and/or calculated it. 
Even if it were true that the Hungarian people are gener-
ally sick, it should also be a common sense knowledge, that in 
every 20 years of an investment or a loan agreement or what-
ever, there will be at least 5-7 bad years too.
Perhaps, of course, it can also be construed, that the case of 
the divorce is not that it is unforeseeable13, but that it is own 
fault (Table 4/C). The figures in this divorce case are again dif-
ferent, but certainly in comfort with the other anwers in the 
previous cases (Table 3/C.), where the pay back is stopped by 
the divorce of the debtor. 
As an average, the respondents feel like helping is neces-
sary for the failing debtors, unless the debtors’ situation can be 
attributed to their own fault, such as divorce. This exception 
of divorce may however derive from the young and idealistic 
age of the respondents rather than represents a social exclusion.
4.2 The market rules are selectively accepted, in 
case of market failure the solutions are generally 
implicitly expected from the state.
The processed data in the tables above (Tables 1-3) have further 
implications. The answers design a relatively ambiguous pattern 
about whether an obligation needs to be performed in the long run 
and who is to bear the burden of failure. Notwithstanding that the 
vast majority of the respondents accept that the creditors (banks?) 
are not profiteers or usurers as seen in tables above (Tables 3/A-
3/C.), yet, only a few of them would go along with the conse-
quences of such a decision. This straightforward conclusion how-
ever needs some clarifications and distinctions, of course.
Albeit depending on the situation, the majority would be 
willing to help in the case of the basic housing problems even 
if the overwhelming majority of these respondents would not 
12 This foreseeability and the damages problems may certainly be different 
if the contract is about management services (Csehi, 2015).
13 According to the statistics (KSH, 2013.), in the last three decades the 
numbers of the divorces in Hungary were the following: 1990: 24.888, 2000: 
23.987, 2012: 21.830, 2013: 20.000 (estimate) and the number of the mar-
riages: 1990: 66.405, 2000: 48.110, 2012: 36.161, 2013: 36.900 (estimate). 
Clearly half as many got married as got divorced. This cannot be construed as 
unforeseeable but surely still as self-default. 
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Table 4 Whether the profit-making is an evil per se? What is the role of responsibility?
Minibrain has an average but well-paying job, which allows him to make plans for long-term future as 
well. He and his wife live with their 2 minor kids together. 
A/a) They want a bigger 
flat, because they still live at 
Minibrain’s parents. So he calcu-
lated that since he cannot afford 
to buy a flat.  he takes a loan, 
which he later fails to pay in due 
instalments, and while his flat is 
going to be auctioned, the rest of 
the debt is still to be paid back
A/b) Minibrain wants to have a 
sport-car/a luxury vacation and 
calculates that even if he had such 
a solid financial background he 
would not be able to cover such 
an expense. So he takes a loan 
which he later fails to pay in due 
instalments, and while his flat is 
going to be auctioned, the rest of 
the debt is still to be paid back.
A/c) Minibrain thinks it is a 
good investment to purchase 
further real estates, to lease 
them or later to sell them for 
more. So he takes a loan which 
he later fails to pay in due 
instalments, and while his flat 
is going to be auctioned, the 
rest of the debt is still to be paid 
back
A
 
If he failed because his employer 
is wound up due to the global 
economic crisis. 
If he failed because his employer 
is wound up due to the global 
economic crisis.
If he failed because his em-
ployer is wound up due to the 
global economic crisis.
 Would you help him? Would you help him? Would you help him?
 yes no yes no yes no
answer 63.13% 32.90% 14.53% 82.40% 24.58% 72.35%
Many believe that creditors are 
rich and usurers (profiteers), 
therefore in these cases the pay 
back is not obligatory. And you?
no 83.73% 28.30% 99.80% 9.80% 80.29% 86.62%
B
 
If he failed because his wife got 
seriously ill and the treatment is 
expensive, time consuming and 
finally he loses his job too.
If he failed because his wife got 
seriously ill and the treatment is 
expensive, time consuming and 
finally he loses his job too.
If he failed because his wife got 
seriously ill and the treatment is 
expensive, time consuming and 
finally he loses his job too.
 Would you help him? Would you help him? Would you help him?
 yes no yes no yes no
answer 84.64% 11.73% 54.75% 42.18% 62.29% 33.52%
Many believe that creditors are 
rich and usurers (profiteers), 
therefore in these cases the pay 
back is not obligatory. And you?
no 82.64% 85.80% 21.92% 85.80% 83.61% 88.04%
C
 
 If he failed because he and his 
wife decide to divorce and the 
facilitation of the two separate 
lives imposes significant 
financial burden. 
 If he failed because he and his 
wife decide to divorce and the 
facilitation of the two separate 
lives imposes significant financial 
burden. 
 If he failed because he and his 
wife decide to divorce and the 
facilitation of the two separate 
lives imposes significant finan-
cial burden. 
 Would you help him? Would you help him? Would you help him?
 yes no yes no yes no
answer 20.95% 74.58% 12.01% 84.64% 13.41% 80.73%
Many believe that creditors are 
rich and usurers (profiteers), 
therefore in these cases the pay 
back is not obligatory. And you?
no 82.79% 88.47% 82.04% 87.65% 78.95% 87.89%
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necessarily blame the creditors for such circumstances. In these 
scenarios the “no” help groups are in minority and basically 
these are the most anxious about the creditors’ being profiteers 
and would allow the non-performance of these contracts from 
the part of the debtors (see explicitly Table 4/A). One might 
realise right away, that these are the scenarios, where failure 
of the performance is caused by the global economic crisis. 
Therefore clearly, here the respondents blame the creditors for 
the surrounding problems. 
The first explanation would be that the respondents simply 
do not care. They accept that help is needed, meaning also that 
they would expect to be assisted in such a case, but they do not 
bother further. This could also reflect that solidarity might well 
be in their thinking but not in their acting. Therefore implicitly, 
all these answers boil down to an acceptance or expectation of 
state interventions. They have no better idea. They do not trust 
the state but neither the market solutions.
Another possible interpretation may be that the vast majority 
believes that the contracts should be fulfilled and if impossi-
bility occurs then it is not termination, but rather a possible 
modification of the contract is needed. And for this, rules are 
needed, of course. Market rules or state regulations? The first 
would lead to a circle problem, the latter to the state interven-
tion again, implicitly.
In any event, these possible clarifications do not exclude 
each other. In the end, both conclusions come to the inevitable 
reliance in the state measures, even if only implicitly. Those 
respondents who would be willing to help right away incline to 
imply to a state measure of intervention into the market affairs. 
No further enquiry is needed, it is the task of the state to man-
age somehow. The big split in answering to the method of help 
(Tables 2/A-2/C) demonstrates the uncertainty of the respon-
dents in this matter.
In the introductory part of the questionnaire, there are some 
general questions posed to map up the respondents’ financial 
and social backgrounds. The vast majority of the respondents 
live in a highly indebted environment as debtors. 75.7% of the 
respondents said “yes” to the question, if he was aware of any 
loan taken in the family.
Their mostly negative experience of getting indebted is 
shown in their answers to the question “to whom would they 
refer to in case of need for a bridging loan”. In case of need the 
vast majority of them would rather refer to the state first and 
then to the parents, way ahead of a financial institute (Table 5)14. 
14 It should be noted, that several answers were allowed to be made here.
Table 5 Who should help you? 
In case you needed a bridging loan. whom would you refer to?
friend parent colleague
6.10% 26.70% 8.90%
employer state other
1.70% 38.60% 59.70%
financial institute
8.90%
If one considers that the informal financial help (parent) 
includes also that of the friends and colleagues, this figure basi-
cally equals with that of the state. This mirrors well the attitude 
of the respondents documented in the comments of the answers, 
namely that in need they would refer privately to friends and 
parents, because if a serious trouble occurred, they would not 
necessarily be expected to pay back the full loan. Certainly, it 
must be added that these respondents are young. 
The serious distrust in the state comes into this picture here 
too. The loan agreement if concluded with the state is less likely 
to be enforced, than if it were signed with a financial institution 
(let alone a private one15). The respondents obviously rely on 
the vision that in case of financial troubles, one would be able to 
(re)negotiate with the state (whatever this institution means here 
for them) just as one could do that with the relatives or friends. 
So the question “who is the creditor” may not be irrelevant 
at all. Therefore special attention should be paid to the answers 
of the category “other”s. Most of the respondents (59.70%) 
would ask money from “other” than friend, parent, colleague, 
financial institute, employer or state. 
It is striking, that in the event of financial difficulties, these 
youngsters would rather avoid the financial institutes. Clearly, 
the mistrust in the banks and other financial institutions is pal-
pable among these respondents. This seems to be the culture: 
the hope (in category “others”) for lottery, for a rich uncle 
abroad, just like in the economically weak Hungary in the 
beginning of the 20th c. (the Horthy-regime). 
This means that these respondents grew up in an environ-
ment that tolerates the non-payback, the failure to perform, 
therefore rather negotiates with those whom they believe they 
can fail later with possibly no consequences at all (friends and 
parents) or with less painful consequences (state as opposed to 
the financial institutions).
Thus conclusively the distrust against the market solutions 
cannot be worse than against that of the state. Who could trust a 
state that can renegotiate contracts. When? Under whose man-
date? And at whose expense?
15 The arguments here necessary lead too far to the free market concept or 
state aid, or of the state as a market participant in the private market, etc, which 
cannot be discussed here. 
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Again, this attitude would lead to a sly, ‘common sense’ 
behaviour, that one should rather be indebted to the state than 
not at all, since if not, then he should only be net contributor to 
the public budget. Whatever simplistic idea this might sound 
this thinking may be mirrored in the answers in the survey.   
It should be noted however, that these responses and com-
ments included also, that in case they were to be asked to lend 
money to a friend in need, mostly they would not have asked 
any security for repayment either, again acknowledging the 
possibility of failure to perform.
4.3 Readiness to help others in need is relatively 
widespread if and only the cause is not self-inflicted 
and the spending is justified
Looking at the figures and the tables, one has to bear two 
things in mind. One would be the problem of impossibility to 
perform, and the other the foreseeability of this risk. 
The fact that the impossibility of certain performance could 
be used as an excuse for the breach of a contract is not at all 
self-evident (Byrd, 2010). The construing of impossibility as a 
defense when non-performance is the fault of none of the par-
ties, may qualify as a legal development. Instead of selling the 
defaulted party as a slave, he can be released from his duties. 
This changes in construing matters of impossibility is regarded 
as a legal development of bona fides in Roman Law and of Treu 
und Glauben (guter Glaube), good faith, fairness or equity in 
the various legal orders in the 18th and 19th centuries respec-
tively (Földi, 2001).
Notwithstanding the above, the real practical question here 
is how to solve the problem of an inefficient private loan agree-
ment. And in addition to it, how to solve this problem if this 
inefficiency is widespread in the economy and affects a great 
deal of average people, as the data of the survey demonstrates 
it well (4.2. above). 
No doubt that in such market failures a state intevention 
has already been approved in many modern constitutionalism, 
especially in those of the welfare states and so in the EU16. 
Legislations, state initiated rules, introduced on behalf of those 
less able to create a bargaining position in free markets are not 
brand new, even if they become more and more nuanced (or 
bureaucratic?) and sometimes less sometimes more intrusive, 
such as the labour contracts, the consumer protection privisions 
or the consumer credit protection regulations, let alone the spe-
cial self-governing rules or ethical codes of certain businesses.
And exactly that is why it is interesting that the respondents 
of this questionnaire seem to have mistrust in the state regula-
tions almost equally to that of the market solutions, even then 
when they mostly believe that help is to be granted. Those who 
16 See e.g. the latest jurisdiction of the CJEU relating to the long-term 
(loan) agreements (C-96/14, C-449/13, C-482/13, C-484/13, C-485/13, C-
487/13, etc).
do not answer “yes” to help do not bother much. But they are 
in the minority.
4.4 However well acknowledged it is, that market 
failures are indispensable, the expected cure from 
the state regulations are just not trusted.
Besides the private debt issues, the survey was intended to 
spread out to the business debts and loans too. 
The playing field here is designed rather for the smaller 
companies (SMEs). In this fictitious case again, the owner of 
a company has an own patent and an excellent long-term busi-
ness model. Although the company had it well for a while, still, 
due to a decreasing demand, the turn over of the company was 
plummeting and turned into a loss. The owner takes more and-
more loans but without further investments the company faces 
bankruptcy. Since the firm’s assets is subject to a secured loan 
taken before, the company cannot receive further commercial 
credit or only at an extra price. 
In this case the questions focused on the rules of being able 
to get a loan, on the administrative restrictions, if any, and on 
the responsibility (or even liability) of a company making solid 
business decisions or on the responsibility of the state to watch 
over these problems, if not more (see Table 6/A-6/C).
The majority of the respondants (71.2%) would not claim 
that the problems of the SMEs here are caused by the admin-
istrative rules. This may be interpreted in two ways though. 
One is that the majority accepts the market rule. The manager 
made bad business decisions. The other one is that the majority 
accepts the administrative rules as a fact but simply thinks that 
here this was not the cause. This is not to wonder. The question 
of course is always a matter of degree.
What is more telling here however (Table 6/A.), is that this 
group of majority which does accept the need for regulations 
and does not blame the adminitrative prescriptions would never-
theless incline to believe that one needs to lie (“declare non-re-
alistic statements”) in formal loan requests (30.50%), which is 
~21% of all responses. Truly though, they are in the minority, 
but what a minority! Truly, also 62.90% of them (which is ~ 
43% of all responses) believe that not disclosing a relevant fact 
in such a request form means fraud and one should be liable for 
that. But that is barely more than the half of the majority who 
accepts the rules, and not even the half of all answerers.
Now, those who do complain about the administrative 
rules are even more interesting. Evidently this is a tiny little 
group (of about 70 respondents) but are more convinced that 
the rules might require false statements to make (44.52%) and 
they also think, that this should qualify as a lie and be punished 
(49.57%). What kind of attitude should there be expected here 
if someone is determined to carry out a transparent but suc-
cessful business?
And finally if one looks at the last question, it is obvious 
that the overwhelming majority of the respondents accept the 
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Table 6 Business plans, market failures and the credit
Megabrain has an own patent and an excellent long-term business model. Thus his small garage-firm leases the seat and the two cars of the company. The company 
had made good profit for some years but recently, due to the decreasing demand, the income of the company was plummeting and turned into a loss in the last couple of 
years. Although there is quite a competition in the market, Megabrain manages to obtain a bridging loan from a bank owe to his good will and connections. However 
Megabrain does not disclose that his patent rights are going to expire and he has no intention to extend it. Without further investments, the company apparently goes 
bankrupt. Since the firm’s assets is subject to a secured loan taken before, the company cannot receive other commercial credit or only at an extra price. In this case 
A
Many would blame the rules, claiming 
that they set administrative obstacles for 
the small entrepreneurs. And You? 
Many would blame the rules, claiming that 
they set administrative obstacles for the 
small entrepreneurs.  And You? 
yes (21.6%) in total population no (71.2%) in total population
Many believe that debtors in a loan agreement often feel 
compelled to declare non-realistic statements.  And You?
yes 44.52% 30.50%
Many believe that Megabrain should be liable for 
fraud.  And You?
yes 49.57% 62.90%
Many believe that Megabrain had happened to be lucky 
and that lately made series of bad business decisions, 
and that he should have either left the business earlier 
or should have invested more by working harder and 
introducing new developments. And you?
yes 84.90% 84.10%
B Many would blame the rules, claiming that they set administrative obstacles for the small entrepreneurs.  And You? Many would blame the rules, claiming that they set administrative obstacles for the small entrepreneurs.  And You? yes (21.6%) in total population no (71.2%) in total population
Many believe that it is the state that has the duty to 
take care of small entrepreneurs in need.  And You?
yes 76.65% 51.36%
tax allowance yes 57.37% 31.52%
non-refundable support yes 29.37% 13.23%
appointment of state liquidator yes 11.47% 11.28%
buy out yes 5.05% 7.00%
C Many would blame the rules, claiming that they set administrative obstacles for the small entrepreneurs.  And You? Many would blame the rules, claiming that they set administrative obstacles for the small entrepreneurs.  And You? yes (21.6%) in total population no (71.2%) in total population
Should there be an insurance fund financed by the 
market participants (companies), which in return, in 
case of bankruptcy, may grant favourable credit to the 
members/companies.  And You?
yes 72.52% 56.21%
No need at all, it is the very task of the state. And You? yes 8.27% 4.18%
market rules by claiming that the business decision of the man-
ager was not adequate. So the overwhelming majority accepts 
the market rules but not the solution.
It is just conspicuous, how the majority of the respondents, 
regardless whether they trust the regulations or not, expect the 
state most of all, implicitly or not, to manage the regulations of the 
business. No doubt that the acceptance of a kind of a state duty to 
take care of small and medium entrepreneurs is more widespread 
among the respondents than not (Table 6/B)17. And surprisingly 
enough (or not?), it is less so (51.36%) among those who are less 
suspicious about the administrative restrictions (71.2%). 
One way to look at it is that those who do blame the adminis-
trative obstacles in SMEs business expect more help and are more 
critical towards the existing rules. Thus in this case one might 
ponder a little bit whether the distinction between the two groups 
17 Please note, that here more answers were possible.
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are a sign of different attitude towards the market and the state or 
rather it is the critical attitude towards a well rooted culture biased 
to state intervention which divides the “yes” and “no” groups.
This thinking might be tested in the responses of the “how”. 
Should the state provide for tax allowance or state aid or manage 
more administrative intervening measures such as the appoint-
ment of state liquidator or carry out a buy-out. None of these 
may be considered as more market-friendly than the others, in 
the end all of these measures result in the taxpayers’ help. 
This is why it is more than striking to have a look at the 
answers in Table 6/C. When there is a rather market like solu-
tion of a saving management (sort of insurance, but obligatory) 
for a possible bankruptcy, the embracement of this institution 
is quite broad as opposed to that of a strict state aid (no matter 
what that might really mean).
5 Who shall have the burden then? 
All in all, one needs to come to the conclusion from the 
answers above that the majority of the respondents favours 
implicitly the state solutions as opposed to the market one, but 
trusts none of them. 
No doubt that the overwhelming majority of the respondents 
accepts the market rules but not the solutions. Or rather, they 
accept the advantages of the market economy but refuse to live 
with their disadvantages. This is no wonder. 
The question is whom to put the burden of remedying the 
bad individual decisions, when the pushing away of the respon-
sibility is quite widespread. This question is even more inter-
esting if one considers the fate of windfalls. Undoubtedly, if 
any windfall derived from this kind of decisions benefited the 
debtors but not the creditors, would be awarded to the debtors 
right away with no hesitation at all, as it was the case before the 
global crisis in the so called long-term consumer loan agree-
ments based on the foreign exchange rates. 
As mentioned at the very beginning, and as is often obvious 
in the answers, the respondents compose a new generation in 
the sense, that they were born after the Transition. This gen-
eration grew up in the stumbling first steps of the democracy 
and the market operations. This generation is uniquely overbur-
dened with private debt, most of which will never be paid back. 
This also reflects the fact that in the childhood of these 
respondents (from the 1990s to the early 2000s) there were no 
solid foundations for a healthy financial understanding in a fastly 
growing globalisation. After having spent several decades in a 
command economy, then a little bit looser state-steered econ-
omy, Hungary has joined the free market economies in a time 
of a decreasing inflation, overall optimism about the capitalistic 
future, and in a swiftly growing world wide consumption. As 
opposed to this global economic background the country had 
faced serious structural economic crisis (pension, health care, 
education), long term financial problems, budgetary restric-
tions, several austerity packages without real solutions.
5.1 The minimum living existence as a fundamental 
(constitutional) right
The lack of private housing for youngsters has ever been 
a problem of the Kadar-regime, thus during (and after) the 
Transition this was one of the issue number one in politics too. 
The then newly established Consitutional Court has inherited 
already cases from its legal ancestor of the previous regime, 
dealing with the then long-term loan agreements. The issuse 
was how to adapt the state subsidized (socialist) loan agree-
ments to the market environment18. 
And this want of an own housing behaviour, this culturally 
over estimated precious goods, is reflected well in the man-
ner of the young generation too. Housing is always more sup-
ported by the respondents than not (first column in Table 7/A), 
in case of illness this solidarity even grows (second column in 
Table 7/A), but plummets considerably if they think the default 
was self-inflicted, as for example in the case of a divorce (third 
column in Table 7/A). 
5.2 The luxurious expenses at the expense of others
The issue of luxurious expenses financed out of a long-term 
loan is a lot more complicated. Here the statements and actions 
do not seem to be in harmony with each other.  
One way to look at it is that the negative impact of the cir-
cumstances triggers always sympathy. And it is true for quite a 
wild range of issues, it may be financial (economic crisis), bio-
logical (illness) or sociological (divorce) problem as certainly 
evidenced in the table below (Table 7/B). 
Why would someone justify a common solidarity for an 
irrational use of others money (i.e. loan)? If one considers the 
cultural and historical background one is compelled to see a 
pattern. The deisre to act and live like a rich man even at the 
expense of others is well rooted in the history. Truly, the vast 
majority would not support this idea. 
However, looking at the first column, at the responses in the 
case of “no”s, it is striking how definitely – almost in consent 
– the blame is put on the creditors if the trouble was caused 
by the financial crisis. This means, that this young generation 
18 See the constitutional Court case No. 32/1991. (VI. 6.) ABH. The case 
in question was about the enormous economic and financial discrepancy in the 
terms and conditions provided for in the newly entered long-term loan agree-
ments on the one hand and those concluded still in the socialist regime on 
the other hand. The interest rate on the old loan was close to none, whereas it 
was around 30-35% in the new loan agreements. The legal issue here was, as 
is now too, whether it is justified for the state to intervene into private agree-
ments and enforce amendments by legislation against even the wills of the 
(both) parties. The very circumstances differ though in a great deal, since the 
Transition back then had proved to be unforeseeable for the parties at the con-
clusion of their contracts, but never again this argument was ever accepted by 
the Constitutional Court until now. The article 226.§ (2) of the Civil Code of 
1959 then in effect was even found by a judge back then constitutionally du-
bious, as a matter of fact, which however granted the means necessary for the 
transition to a market economy.
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Table 7 Who should have the burden of failure?
Minibrain has an average but well-paying job, which allows him to make plans 
for long-term future as well. He and his wife live with their 2 minor kids together. 
If he failed because his em-
ployer is wound up due to 
the global economic crisis. 
If he failed because his 
wife got seriously ill and 
the treatment is expensive, 
time consuming and fi-
nally he looses his job too.
If he failed because he and his 
wife decide to divorce and the 
facilitation of the two separate 
lives imposes significant 
financial burden. 
A
 
A/a)  They want a bigger flat, because they still live at Minibrain’s parents. So he calculated 
that since he cannot afford to buy a flat. He takes a loan, which he later fails to pay in due 
instalments, and while his flat is going to be auctioned, the rest of the debt is still to be paid back
 Would you help him? Would you help him? Would you help him?
answer yes no yes no yes no
 63.13% 32.90% 84.64% 11.73% 20.96% 74.58%
Would you reconsider it, if you knew that he could 
not pay because he saved money for retirement, 
illness and education for his children?
yes 42.11% 9.20% 44.44% 9.79% 34.02% 12.10%
Would you support an individual bankruptcy? yes 55.34% 15.30% 61.81% 25.83% 52.05% 31.50%
Would you support a preferential tax system for 
debtors?
no 48.80% 19.70% 55.56% 81.03% 59.02% 74.82%
Many believe that creditors are rich and usurers 
(profiteers), therefore in these cases the pay back is 
not obligatory. And you?
no 83.73% 28.30% 82.64% 85.80% 82.79% 88.47%
B  
A/b) Minibrain wants to have a sport-car/a luxury vacation and calculates that 
even if he had such a solid financial background he would not be able to cover 
such an expense. So he takes a loan which he later fails to pay in due instalments, 
and while his flat is going to be auctioned, the rest of the debt is still to be paid back.
 Would you help him? Would you help him? Would you help him?
answer yes no yes no yes no
 14.53% 82.40% 54.75% 42.18% 12.01% 84.64%
Would you reconsider it, if you knew that he could 
not pay because he saved money for retirement, ill-
ness and education for his children?
yes 50.19% 1.10% 11.79% 9.79% 31.39% 8.43%
Would you support an individual bankruptcy? yes 65.96% 5.20% 16.39% 25.83% 50.65% 29.22%
Would you support a preferential tax system for 
debtors?
no 58.17% 7.90% 14.73% 81.03% 44.82% 79.22%
Many believe that creditors are rich and usurers 
(profiteers), therefore in these cases the pay back is 
not obligatory. And you?
no 99.80% 9.80% 21.92% 85.80% 82.04% 87.65%
C  
A/c) Minibrain thinks it is a good investment to purchase further real estates, to lease them 
or later to sell them for more. So he takes a loan which he later fails to pay in due instal-
ments, and while his flat is going to be auctioned, the rest of the debt is still to be paid back
 Would you help him? Would you help him? Would you help him?
answer yes no yes no yes no
 24.58% 72.35% 62.29% 33.52% 13.41% 80.73%
Would you reconsider it, if you knew that he could 
not pay because he saved money for retirement, 
illness and education for his children?
yes 38.94% 8.51% 34.25% 4.55% 43.61% 9.99%
Would you support an individual bankruptcy? yes 48.08% 32.30% 51.57% 21.29% 49.62% 26.97%
Would you support a preferential tax system for 
debtors?
no 46.63% 73.78% 42.36% 84.21% 49.62% 79.15%
Many believe that creditors are rich and usurers 
(profiteers), therefore in these cases the pay back is 
not obligatory. And you?
no 80.29% 86.62% 83.61% 88.04% 78.95% 87.89%
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overwhelmingly holds the creditors (most likely the fiancial sec-
tors in this case) responsible for the global economic crisis, and 
the debtors of such contracts as victims. Therefore the obligations 
may be forgiven. And what is more, probably that is why, it is 
here where the preferential tax regime is the most advocated.
And if it is so, which is very much evidenced here, the ques-
tion is, those who would help (and do not think that the obliga-
tions are to be forgiven, see second column group “yes”) would 
do that for what reason? As a matter of fact, this proves to be 
the group of people with real sympathy to others problems. The 
proper means for help is not clear though. The group is divided 
in almost all measures by half and half.
Further interesting results are in the third column of 
Table 7/B. Here, it seems, the respondents regard the specula-
tor/investor as being part of the problem rather than a victim. 
So the help is missing here the most.
5.3 Speculation or investment (business without the 
legal formalities)
Originally, this question is to analyse the attitude towards hus-
tlers, slickers (“ügyeskedők”). In this situation the debtor, with-
out setting up a proper business as required by the law, acts as a 
“businessman” and uses the possibility to make money in a much 
friendlier, easier environment, clearly at the expense of others. 
No doubt, this hustler manner is fairly well scattered in the 
Hungarian society, nevertheless the respondents do not quite 
seem to realise it. Unquestionably, most of them would cathe-
gorise this situation as a speculation not worthy of help and as 
a problem caused by own fault, and the debtor himself as the 
problem maker rather than the victim. 
This doubt of presumption however, whether here the 
respondents are biased against business or speculation as such 
or just really identified the actors as hustlers, thereby not wor-
thy of help, remains still to be developed.
6 Conclusions
As for a really brief conclusion of the survey, one could say 
that the respondents act very logically and calculate very ratio-
nally. They do so, even if they mostly have no basic knowledge 
of the issues above but a hunch. The problem is that acting irre-
sponsibly is rational because it pays off better than acting by 
the rules. To be able to embrace the disadvantages of the mar-
ket economy one needs to be able to understand and manage 
them institutionally. This survey, as it stands now, demonstrates 
exactly the lack of such an insight. 
The results depict a latently, vaguely rather messianistic, 
though not trusted, expectation from the state, whatever that 
should mean. This vague expectation for a solution may cer-
tainly be interpreted also as a general need to push the respon-
sibility away. This suggestion may well be demonstrated by 
the answers, which show a relatively ready help but also a split 
mostly in half and half in the “how”s. The “how” is just does 
not matter. So it might reflect just a general desire of goodness 
without the thorough understanding of or deliberations of the 
(unintended) consequences19.
Clearly these youngsters have no experiences of themselves 
so far, so the responses mirror rather a cultural heritage20. 
In these circumstances loan is an alternative, but exactly 
in these circumstances this loan is a very expensive alterna-
tive. Without trust (and it means here saving/investment too) 
in the system, the price of the loan is just going to be soaring, 
because it may be excused to fail the agreement regardless the 
consequences.
As to a final impression and conclusion, one faces a very 
blurred picture. Albeit it is clear that the overwhelming major-
ity of the respondents accepts that the long-term promises are 
binding, still quite many of them are ready to appreciate the 
troubles of the debtor, especially if those troubles were caused 
by the global economic crisis or illness. None of these causes 
are considered by the respondents as a risk which needs to be 
(or should be) calculated or managed privately right before 
the entering into a contract. Thus it seems that the majority 
of the respondents feel deeper for those in – not self-inflicted 
– needs. What own fault means however is not very clear and 
distinctive. This sympathy is also clouded by the fact that the 
solutions in these situations are not consequential. Their desire 
to help therefore are not supported by the reality but by some 
vague expectations from the public funds, the public hand 
(darely paraphrasing Smith). 
So, as it seems, the operation of the market is widely 
approved, working for profit is not at all cursed, provided, there 
are no failures. If market failure occurred, the solution is not 
expected from the market but rather from a vague conception 
of the state aid.
One might think right away, that basically this is what one 
witnesses also in the developed, welfare states too. In case of 
market failure the regulation is felt to be necessary and right. 
The difference is however, that here there is a traditional mis-
giving about the governmental interferences or reactions. Not 
because of the fear from the state intervening into the private 
autonomy, but because the state proves to be incompetent.
Assuming that these conclusions are justified, the results 
are quite thought-provoking. A quarter of a century after the 
Transition, the new generation’s reactions to the occuring 
financial-social problems have roots in the past socialism 
rather than in the capitalism. The reasons why the Transition 
– due to the global collapse of the Soviet regime – was so 
19 The eagerness to insulate the decision-makers from the negative conse-
quences of their own bad economic decisions is so vivid, that it is quite a topic 
again in the public discourse relating to the amendments of the brand new Civil 
Code. See Article. 2. of the bill No. T/10528 of the government concerning 
Article 3:24. on the liability of the company management in various cases.
20 This lack of trust in the state operation is surveyed – among others – by 
András Sajó (Sajó, 2008).
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undeniably overwhelmingly popular are just gone. The deep 
distrust in a paternalistic state, the devastating experiences of 
state intrusion, the dislike of socialist “Gleichschaltung”, the 
desire to motivate creativity so that to enhance individual inde-
pendence, autonomy and self-esteem are not even traceable. 
What is left nowadays is the capitalistic objectives (an avidity 
to be wealthy) without the capitalistic virtues (the autonomous, 
financially independent, deliberating citizen).
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